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Space is big. It is very, very big. On the currently most favored cosmological theories, we 
are living in an infinite world, a world that contains an infinite number of planets, stars, 
galaxies, and black holes. This is an implication of most “multiverse theories”, according 
to which our universe is just one in a vast ensemble of physically real universes. But it is 
also a consequence of the standard Big Bang cosmology, if combined with the 
assumption that our universe is open or flat, as recent evidence suggests it is. An open or 
flat universe – assuming the simplest topology1 – is spatially infinite at any time and 
contains infinitely many planets etc.2 
 Philosophical investigations relating to the vastness of the cosmos have focused 
on the fine-tuning of our universe. “Fine-tuning” refers to the alleged fact that the laws of 
physics are such that if any of several physical constants had been even slightly different, 
then life would not have existed. A philosophical cottage industry has arisen from the 
controversies surrounding issues such as whether fine-tuning is in some sense 
“improbable”, whether it should be regarded as surprising3, whether it calls out for 
  
explanation (and if so whether a multiverse theory could explain it4, whether it suggests 
ways in which current physics is incomplete5, or whether it is evidence for the hypothesis 
that our universe was designed6. 
Here I wish instead to address a more fundamental problem: How can vast-world 
cosmologies have any observational consequences at all? I will show that these 
cosmologies imply, or give a very high probability to, the proposition that every possible 
observation is in fact made. This creates a challenge: if a theory is such that for any 
possible human observation that we specify, the theory says that that observation will be 
made, then how do we test the theory? What could possibly count as negative evidence? 
And if all theories that share this feature are equally good at predicting the data we will 
get, then how can empirical evidence distinguish between them? 
I call this a “ challenge”  because current cosmological theories clearly do have 
connections to observation. Cosmologists are constantly modifying and refining theories 
in light of empirical findings, and they are presumably not irrational in doing so. But it is 
a philosophical problem to account for how this is possible. 
One lesson that will emerge is that we must be careful about how we construe the 
evidence. We know not only that such-and-such observations are made (which we shall 
show is impotent as a basis for evaluating Big World theories): we also know that such-
and-such observations are made by us. This indexical de se component of our evidence 
turns out to be crucial to cosmology, and recognizing this is the first step to the solution 
that I shall propose. 
  
The second step is to formulate a new methodological principle that describes the 
probabilistic evidential bearing of (partly) indexical information on non-indexical 
hypotheses. 
With the expanded evidence base and the new rule, we can explain how Big 
World theories are testable. We will also hint at how the epistemological theory we 
outline is useful in other areas of philosophy and scientific methodology. 
But first, let us study in more detail how things go wrong if we construe the 
evidence non-indexically, in the form “ Such-and-such an observation is made” . We can 
be generous and take “ an observation”  in a broad sense to include the total 
phenomenological content present in the observer’s mind. We do not, however, at this 
stage take “ observing”  as success verb, implying the veracity of observations; but rather, 
we assume an internal reading of the evidence. This assumption will later be relaxed. 
 
I. THE CONUNDRUM 
Consider a random phenomenon, for instance Hawking radiation. When black holes 
evaporate, they do so in a random manner such that for any given physical object there is 
a finite (although extremely small) probability that it will be emitted by any given black 
hole in a given time interval. Such things as boots, computers, or ecosystems have some 
finite probability of popping out from a black hole. The same holds true, of course, for 
human bodies and human brains in particular states.7 Assuming that mental states 
supervene on brain states, there is thus a finite probability that a black hole will produce a 
brain in a state of making any given observation. Some of the observations made by such 
a brains will be illusory and some will be truthful. For example, some brains produced by 
  
black holes will have the illusory of experience of reading a measurement device that 
does not exist. Other brains, with the same experiences, will be making veridical 
observations – a measurement device may materialize together with the brain and may 
have caused the brain to make the observation. But the point that matters here is that any 
observation we could make has a finite probability of being produced by any given black 
hole. 
 The probability of anything macroscopic and organized appearing from a black 
hole is of course minuscule. The probability of a given conscious brain-state being 
created is tinier still. Yet even a low-probability outcome has a high probability of 
occurring if the random process is repeated often enough. And that is precisely what 
happens in our world, if the cosmos is very vast. In the limiting case where the cosmos 
contains an infinite number of black holes, the probability of any given observation being 
made is one.8 
 There are good grounds for believing that our universe is open and contains an 
infinite number of black holes. Therefore, we have reason to think that any possible 
human observation is in fact instantiated in the actual world.9 Evidence for the existence 
of a multiverse would only add further support to this proposition. 
 It is not necessary to invoke black holes to make this point. Any random physical 
phenomenon would do. It seems we don’t even have to limit the argument to quantum 
fluctuations. Classical thermal fluctuations could, presumably, in principle lead to the 
molecules in a gas cloud containing the right elements to spontaneously bump into each 
other so as to form a biological structure such as a human brain. 
  
 The problem is that it seems impossible to get any empirical evidence that could 
distinguish between various Big World theories. For any observation we make, all such 
theories assign a probability of one to the hypothesis that that observation is made. That 
means that the fact that the observation is made is no reason whatever for preferring one 
of these theories to the others. Experimental results appear totally irrelevant.10 
We can see this formally as follows. Let B be the proposition that we are in a Big 
World, defined as one that is big enough and random enough to make it highly probable 
that every possible human observation is made. Let T be some theory that is compatible 
with B, and let E be some proposition asserting that some specific observation is made. 
Let P be an epistemic probability function. Bayes’s theorem states that 
 
P(T|E&B) = P(E|T&B)P(T|B) / P(E|B). 
 
In order to determine whether E makes a difference to the probability of T (relative to the 
background assumption B), we need to compute the difference P(T|E&B) - P(T|B). By 
some simple algebra it is easy to see that 
 
P(T|E&B) - P(T|B) ≈ 0 if and only if P(E|T&B) ≈ P(E|B). 
 
This means that E will fail to give empirical support to T (modulo B) if E is about equally 
probable given T&B as it is given B. We saw above that P(E|T&B) ≈ P(E|B) ≈ 1. 
Consequently, whether E is true or false is irrelevant for whether we should believe in T, 
given we know B. 
  
 To illustrate, let T2 be some perverse permutation of an astrophysical theory T1 
that we actually embrace. T2 differs from the T1 by assigning a different value to some 
physical constant. To be specific, let us suppose that T1 says that the temperature of the 
cosmic microwave background radiation is about 2.7 Kelvin (which is the observed 
value) whereas T2 says it is, say, 3.1 K. Suppose furthermore that both T1 and T2 imply 
that we are living in a Big World. One would have thought that our experimental 
evidence favors T1 over T2. Yet the above argument seems to show that this view is 
mistaken. Our observational evidence supports T2 just as much as T1. We really have no 
reason to think that the background radiation is 2.7 K rather than 3.1 K. 
 
II. IT’S NOT THE OLD POINT ABOUT UNDERDETERMINATION OF THEORY 
BY DATA 
At first blush, it could seem as if this simply rehashes the lesson, made familiar by 
Duhem and Quine, that it is always possible to rescue a theory from falsification by 
modifying some auxiliary assumption, so that strictly speaking no scientific theory ever 
implies any observational consequences. The above argument would then merely have 
provided an illustration of how this general result applies to cosmological theories. 
However, this would be to miss the point. 
 If the argument given above is correct, it establishes a much more radical 
conclusion. It purports to show that all Big World theories are not only logically 
compatible with any observational evidence, but they are also perfectly probabilistically 
compatible. They all give the same conditional probability (namely one) to every 
observation statement E defined as above. This entails that no such observation statement 
  
can have any bearing, whether logical or probabilistic, on whether the theory is true. If 
that were the case, it would not seem worthwhile to make astronomical observations if 
what we are interested in is determining which Big World theory to favor. The only 
reasons we could have for choosing between such theories would be either a priori 
(simplicity, elegance, etc.) or pragmatic (such as ease of calculation). 
 Nor is the argument making the ancient statement that human epistemic faculties 
are fallible, that we can never be certain that we are not dreaming or are brains in a vat. 
No, the point here is not that such illusions could occur, but rather that we have reason to 
believe that they do occur, not just some of them but all possible ones. In other words, we 
can be fairly confident that the observations we make, along with all possible 
observations we could make in the future, are being made by brains in vats and by 
humans that have spontaneously materialized from black holes or from thermal 
fluctuations. The argument would entail that this abundance of observations makes it 
impossible to derive distinguishing observational consequences from contemporary 
cosmological theories. 
 
III. THE CONCLUSION IS A REDUCTIO 
I trust that most readers will find this conclusion unacceptable. Cosmologists certainly 
appear to be doing experimental work and modify their theories in light of new empirical 
findings. The COBE satellite, the Hubble Space Telescope, and other devices are 
showering us with data that have been causing something of a renaissance in the world of 
astrophysics in recent years. Yet the argument described above would show that the 
empirical import of this information could never go beyond the humble role of providing 
  
support for the hypothesis that we are living in a Big World, for instance by showing that 
the universe is open. Nothing apart from this one fact could be learnt from such 
observations. Once we have established that the universe is open and infinite, then any 
further work in observational astronomy would be a waste of time and money. 
 Worse still, the leaky connection between theory and observation in cosmology 
spills over into other domains. Since nothing hinges on how we defined T in the 
derivation above, the argument can easily be extended to prove that observation does not 
have a bearing on any scientific question so long as we assume that we are living in a Big 
World.11 
 This consequence is absurd, so we should look for a way to mend the 
methodological pipeline and restore the flow of testable observational consequences from 
Big World theories. How can we do that? 
 
IV. GIVING UP THE INTERNAL CONSTRUAL OF “ OBSERVATION”  DOESN’T 
SAVE US 
Suppose we give up the internal construal of “ observation”  and instead take the term as a 
success verb, so that observing, say, a blue table implies that there is a blue table that is 
causally responsible for the observation. Suppose further that we couple this with the 
postulation that we are entitled (and perhaps even required) to have a prior credence 
function that strongly favors the hypothesis that we for the most part really do observe (in 
the success sense) what it seems to us that we are observing. Then it might appear as if 
we have an exit from our predicament. (Alternatively, we could formulate this escape 
plan by sticking to the original internal definition of “ observation”  and adding the 
  
postulate that our prior credence functions should strongly favor the veridicality of our 
observations.) 
 However, even setting aside foundationalist scruples, the proposed solution 
doesn’t get us out of the pickle. 
To see this, consider that observers are not the only things that have a finite 
probability of being generated in random systems. On the same ground that we should 
expect human observers in all possible states to be ejected from black holes or to form 
from vastly improbable thermal fluctuations, we should also expect all physically 
possible local environments to spring forth. So not only are there observers having all 
sorts of illusions (of seeing a blue table or reading a measurement apparatus) but 
additionally there are observers making all sorts of veridical observations (actually seeing 
a blue table or reading off instruments in each of their possible output states). 
Consequently, even if we assume our observations to be veridical, we are still left with 
the problem that our current best theories give probability one to the existence of all 
possible such observations together with their truth-making local environments. (See 
Figure 1). We can even press on to the conclusion that for any possible human 
observation, there may be habitats in which that observation is appropriately caused by 
the observed object and in which the observer’s perceptions in general track her 
surroundings.12 
  
 
A qualification is due. While small-scale environments, e.g. ones that include 
tables and measuring apparatuses, are on a par with human bodies, it is not clear that very 
large systems such as galactic superclusters could be produced by any of the random 
processes that we have discussed. If we stipulate that we are making veridical 
observations of these mega-scale entities, we could thus salvage the testability of some 
aspects of cosmological theories that concern these large-scale entities. Yet this would be 
of little avail since it would not rescue the rest of our epistemic practices, which deal with 
medium-sized and small things. Observations of such items would still be subject to the 
charge of being radically irrelevant to our theories about the world, modulo the Big 
World hypothesis.13 
 A further shortcoming of the proposal (apart from the fact that it doesn’ t work) is 
that it doesn’ t tell us anything about the defeasibility conditions of the purported principle 
that you should be strongly biased in favor of the veridicality of your observations. 
Clearly, there are cases where it would be unreasonable to believe that one’ s observations 
are veridical. For example, if you knew that almost all observers in your current situation 
(tucked in, let’ s say, between the bedsheets in a detox unit with the sensation of bugs 
crawling under your skin) were hallucinating, then you should not believe that your 
Figure 1: Even if we disregard illusory observations or assume that our observations 
are veridical, our observation a (seeing the background radiation as 2.7 K) is perfectly 
compatible with both T1 (which implies that CMB is 2.7 K everywhere (A) except 
where an unusual fluctuation has occurred (B)) and T2 (which implies that CMB is 
generally 3.1 K expect for fluctuations). 
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current observations are veridical, unless you had additional information defeating that 
conclusion. A satisfactory account of the Big World case ought to have at least something 
to say about why the presence of lots of hallucinating and otherwise misled observers in 
Big Worlds does not undermine our confidence in the reliability of our own observations 
while the contrary holds specifically for clients in the methadone clinic and other such 
special situations. 
 So if an externalist construal of the evidence is not the answer, what is? 
 
V. RESTORING THE FLOW OF TESTABLE CONSEQUENCES VIA A LIMITED 
INDIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE OVER DE SE STATEMENTS 
It may seem as if our troubles originate from the somewhat “ technical”  point that in a 
large enough cosmos, every observation will be made by some freakish observers here 
and there. It remains the case, however, that those observers are exceedingly rare and far 
between. For every observation made by a freak observer spontaneously materializing 
from Hawking radiation or thermal fluctuations, there are trillions upon trillions of 
observations made by regular observers who have evolved on planets like our own and 
who make veridical observations of the universe. Why can we not solve the problem, 
then, by saying that although all these freak observers exist and are suffering from 
various illusions (or are making veridical but unrepresentative observations), it is highly 
unlikely that we are among their numbers? Then we should think, rather, that we are very 
probably one of the regular observers whose observations reflect reality. We could safely 
ignore the freak observers and their illusions and misleading perceptions in most contexts 
when doing science. 
  
 In my view, this response suggests the right way to proceed. Because the freak 
observers are in such a tiny minority, their observations can be disregarded for most 
purposes. It is possible that we are freak observers – we should assign to that hypothesis 
some finite probability, but such a tiny one that it does not make any practical difference. 
 If we want to run with this idea, it is crucial that we construe our evidence 
differently than we did above. If our evidence is simply “ Such and such an observation is 
made”  then the evidence has probability one given any Big World theory – and we ram 
our heads straight into the problems I described. But if we construe our evidence in the 
more specific form “ We are making such and such observations”  then we have a way out. 
For we can then say that although Big World theories make it probable that some such 
observations be made, they need not make it probable that we should be the ones making 
them. 
 Let us therefore define: 
 
E’ := “ Such and such observations are made by us”  
 
E’ contains an indexical de se component that the original evidence-statement we 
considered, E, did not. E’ is logically stronger than E. The rationality requirement that 
one should take all relevant evidence into account dictates that in case E’ leads to 
different conclusions than does E, then it is E’ that determines what we ought to believe. 
A question that now arises is how to determine the evidential bearing that 
statements of the form of E’ have on cosmological theories. Using Bayes’ s theorem, we 
can turn the question around and ask, how do we evaluate P(E’ |T&B), the conditional 
  
probability that a Big World theory gives to us making certain observations? The 
argument in the foregoing sections showed that if we hope to be able to derive any 
empirical implications from Big World theories, then P(E’ |T&B) should not generally be 
set to unity or close to unity. P(E’ |T&B) must take on values that depend on the particular 
theory and the particular evidence that we are we are considering. Some theories T are 
supported by some evidence E’ ; for these choices P(E’ |T&B) is relatively large. For other 
choices of E’  and T, the conditional probability will be much smaller. 
 To be concrete, consider the two rival theories T1 and T2 about the temperature of 
the cosmic microwave background. Let E’  be the proposition that we have made those 
observations that cosmologists innocently take to support T1. E’  includes readings from 
radio telescopes etc. Intuitively, we want P(E’ |T1&B) > P(E’ |T2&B). That inequality must 
be the reason why cosmologists believe that the background radiation is in accordance 
with T1 rather than T2, since a priori there is no ground for assigning T1 a substantially 
greater probability than T2. 
A natural way to achieve this result is by postulating that we should think of 
ourselves as being in some sense “ random”  observers. Here we use the idea that the 
essential difference between T1 and T2 is that the fraction of observers that would be 
making observations in agreement with E’  is enormously greater on T1 than on T2. If we 
reason as if we were randomly selected samples from the set of all observers, or from 
some suitable subset thereof, then we can explicate the conditional probability P(E’ |T&B) 
in terms of the expected fraction of all observers in the reference class that the 
conjunction of T and B says would be making the kind of observations that E’  says that 
  
we are making. As we shall see, this postulate enables us to conclude that P(E’ |T1&B) > 
P(E’ |T2&B). 
Let us call this postulate the Self-Sampling Assumption: 
 
(SSA) Observers should reason as if they were a random sample from the set of 
all observers in their reference class. 
 
The general problem of how to define the reference class is complicated, and I shall not 
address it here. For the purposes of this paper we can think of the reference class as 
consisting of all observers who will ever have existed. We can also assume a uniform 
sampling density over this reference class. Moreover, it simplifies things if we set aside 
complications arising from assigning probabilities over infinite domains by assuming that 
B entails that the number of observers is finite, albeit such a large finite number that the 
problems described above obtain. These assumptions help us focus on basic principles. 
 Here is how SSA supplies the missing link needed to connect theories like T1 and 
T2 to observation. On T2, the only observers who observe an apparent temperature of the 
cosmic microwave background CMB ≈ 2.7 K are those who either have various sorts of 
rare illusions (for example because their brains have been generated by black holes and 
are therefore not attuned to the world they are living in) or happen to be located in 
extremely atypical places (where e. g. a thermal fluctuation has led to a locally elevated 
CMB temperature). On T1, by contrast, almost every observer who makes the appropriate 
astronomical measurements and is not deluded will observe CMB ≈ 2.7 K. A much 
greater fraction of the observers in the reference class observe CMB ≈ 2.7 K if T1 is true 
  
than if T2 is true. By SSA, we consider ourselves as random observers; so it follows that 
on T1 we would be much more likely to find ourselves as one of those observers who 
observe CMB ≈ 2.7 K than we would on T2. Therefore, P(E’ |T1&B) >> P(E’ | T2&B). 
Supposing that the prior probabilities of T1 and T2 are roughly the same, P(T1) ≈ P(T2), it 
is then trivial to derive via Bayes’ s theorem that P(T1|E’&B) > P(T2|E’&B). This 
vindicates the intuitive view that we do have empirical evidence that favors T1 over T2. 
 The job that SSA is doing in this derivation is to enable the step from a 
proposition about fractions of observers to propositions about corresponding 
probabilities. We get the propositions about fractions of observers by analyzing T1 and T2 
and combining them with relevant background information B; from this we conclude that 
there would be an extremely small fraction of observers observing CMB ≈ 2.7 K given T2 
and a much larger fraction given T1. We then consider the evidence E’ , which is that we 
are observing CMB ≈ 2.7 K. SSA authorizes us to think of the “ we”  as a kind of random 
variable ranging over the class of actual observers. From this it then follows that E’  is 
more probable given T1 than given T2. But without assuming SSA, all we can say is that a 
greater fraction of observers observe CMB ≈ 2.7 K if T1 is true, and at that point the 
argument would grind to a halt. We could not reach the conclusion that T1 is supported 
over T2. For this reason I propose that SSA, or something like it, be adopted as a 
methodological principle. 
 It may seem mysterious how probabilities of this sort can exist – how can we 
possibly make sense of the idea that there was some chance that we might have been 
other observers than we are? However, what I am suggesting here is not the existence of 
some objective, or physical, chances. I am not suggesting that there is a physical 
  
randomization mechanism, a cosmic fortune wheel as it were, that assigns souls to bodies 
in a stochastic manner. Rather, we should think of these probabilities as epistemic. They 
are part of a proposal explicating the epistemic relations that hold between theories (such 
as T1 and T2) and evidence (such as E’ ) containing a de se component. We can view SSA 
as a kind of restricted indifference principle that applies to credences over de se 
propositions, or sets of centered possible worlds in the Quinean terminology. The status 
of SSA could also be regarded as in some respects akin to that of the David Lewis’ s 
Principal Principle14, which expresses a connection between physical chance and 
epistemic credence. Crudely put, the Principal Principle says that if you know that the 
objective (physical) chance of some outcome A is x%, then you should assign a credence 
of x% to A (unless you have additional “ inadmissible”  information). Analogously, SSA 
can be read as saying that if you know that a fraction x% of all observers in your 
reference class are in some type of position A, then you should assign a prior credence of 
x% to being in a type-A position. This prior credence must, of course, be conditionalized 
on any other relevant information you have in order to get the posterior credence, i.e. the 
degrees of belief you should actually have given all you know. Thus, after 
conditionalizing on the observation that CMB ≈ 2.7 K, you get, trivially, a posterior 
function that assigns zero credence to the hypothesis that you are an observer that 
observes CMB ≈ 3.1 K. But it is the higher conditional prior credence (according to SSA) 
of observing that CMB ≈ 2.7 K given T1 than given T2 that renders it the case that 
conditionalizing on this observation preferentially supports T1. 
 
VI. AN ILLUSTRATION 
  
We can illustrate how SSA works by a simple thought experiment.  
 
Blackbeards and Whitebeards.  
In an otherwise empty world there are three rooms. God tosses a fair coin and 
creates three observers as a result, placing them in different rooms. If the coin 
falls heads, He creates two observers with black beards and one with a white 
beard. If it falls tails, it is the other way around: He creates two whitebeards and 
one blackbeard. All observers are aware of these conditions. There is a mirror in 
each room, so observers know the color of their own beard. You find yourself in 
one of the rooms and you see that you have a black beard. What credence should 
you give to the hypothesis that the coin fell heads? 
 
The situation is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Tails 
Heads 
Figure 2: The ‘Blackbeards and Whitebeards’  thought experiment. 
  
Because of the direct analogy to the cosmology case, we know that the answer must be 
that you should assign a greater credence to Heads than to Tails. Let us apply SSA and 
see how we get this result. 
 From the setup, we know that the prior probability of Heads is 50%. This is the 
probability you should assign to Heads before you have looked in the mirror and thus 
before you know your beard color. That this probability is 50% follows from the 
Principal Principle together with the fact you know that the coin toss was fair. We thus 
have 
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Next we consider the conditional probability of you observing that you have black beard 
given a specific outcome of the toss. If the coin fell heads, then two out of three observers 
observe themselves having a black beard. If the coin fell tails, then one out of three 
observe having a black beard. By SSA, you reason as if you were a randomly sampled 
observer, giving 
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Using Bayes’ s theorem, we can then calculate the conditional probability of Heads given 
that you have a black beard: 
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After looking in the mirror and learning that your beard is black you should therefore 
assign a credence of 32  to Heads and 31  to Tails. 
 This result mirrors that of the cosmology example. Because one theory (T1, 
Heads) entails that a greater fraction of all observers are observing what you are 
observing (E’ , Black) than does another theory (T2, Tails), the former theory obtains 
preferential support from your observation. 
 
VII. SUMMARY: WE NEED A METHODOLOGY FOR EVIDENCE WITH A DE SE 
COMPONENT 
Big World theories, popular in contemporary cosmology, engender a peculiar 
methodological problem: because they say the world is very big and somewhat 
stochastic, they imply (or make it highly probable) that every possible human observation 
is made. The difficulty is that it is unclear how we could ever have empirical reasons for 
preferring one such theory to another, since they all seem to fit equally well with 
whatever we observe. This skeptical threat is different from and much more radical than 
the problem of underdetermination of theory by data associated with Duhem and Quine. 
And if left unfixed, the broken connection between observation and theory spills over 
from cosmology into other domains. 
  
We saw that the leakage cannot be stopped even by blocking all consideration 
given to the possibility of illusory observations, because the maverick observations made 
in Big Worlds include veridical ones as well as illusions. Instead, we proposed to repair 
methodology by means of a new epistemic principle, the Self-Sampling Assumption, 
which takes into account the de se component of our evidence. This principle connects 
Big World theories to observation in an intuitively plausible way and vindicates the 
practices of cosmologists who test hypotheses against experimental findings. 
 The Self-Sampling Assumption has implications in other problem areas in science 
and philosophy. It can be seen as an explication of the anthropic principle, understood in 
the original spirit of by Brandon Carter, a theoretical physicist whose seminal work 
opened the door to a systematic exploration of observation selection effects.15 
Observation selection effects are a kind of bias that may be present in our data that is not 
due to limitations in our measurement apparatuses but to the fact that our data are 
preconditioned on the existence of a suitably positioned observer to “ have”  the data (and 
to build the instruments in the first place). Carter investigated the relevance of 
observation selection effects for attempts to evaluate the bearing of our current evidence 
on questions such as how improbable it is for complex life forms to evolve on a given 
Earth-like planet or how many critical improbable steps were involved in our evolution.16 
To illustrate, take one of the simplest points Carter made: Even if a theory says that the 
probability for an Earth-like planet of giving rise to intelligent life is small, the theory 
will still perfectly fit our observation of intelligent life having evolved on this planet 
provided that the total number of Earth-like planets is large enough for it to have been 
probable, according to the theory, that intelligent life should arise somewhere.  
  
Similar modes of reasoning are invoked in some discussions of no-collapse 
versions of quantum mechanics17 and, as hinted at in the introduction, they play a central 
role in the debate about the significance of the apparent fine-tuning of our universe and 
the capacity of multiverse theories to explain it. Even an application to traffic planning 
has been discovered.18 On the more theoretical side, we have game theoretic problems 
involving imperfect recall, such as the Absent-Minded Driver problem19 and its 
philosophical, more purely epistemic analogue, the Sleeping Beauty problem20. 
What these various topics have in common is that they involve the assignment of 
conditional credences to statements of the form “ I make such and such observations 
given that the world is such and such.” 21 In other words, they involve the evaluation of a 
de se component of our evidence: our knowledge that we are the ones making a certain 
observation or that we are the ones who have a certain piece of (otherwise non-indexical) 
evidence. Our duty to objectivity must not be misunderstood as a license to ignore de se 
clues. The considerations advanced in this paper impose constraints on what can count as 
a satisfactory methodology for fashioning knowledge out of this indexical part our 
epistemic raw material. Such a methodology, a general theory of observation selection 
effects and its various scientific and philosophical applications, is something I have 
attempted to set forth elsewhere.22 
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